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THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE SECULAR
WORKPLACE
DAVID L. GREGORY*
I have been asked to sort out the implications of first
amendment religion clauses jurisprudence for labor and
employment law. I deliberately will not attempt to elucidate
yet another taxonomy, topography, meta-theory, or some other
polysyllabic, multi-part constitutional law test seemingly so cer-
tain to harmonize the law, and thus even more certainly des-
tined for frustration. I do want to share some thoughts and
concerns with you from my perspective as a labor and employ-
ment academic lawyer.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 generally prohibits
discrimination in most employment on the basis of religion; the
federal statute also requires the employer to accommodate rea-
sonably the employee's religious practice. Thus, Title VII, as
well as the first amendment religion clauses must be brought to
bear upon considerations of the role of religion in the secular
workplace.
The intersections of Title VII and the first amendment
religion clauses hardly mark smooth thoroughfares. The law
remains fragmented by a seemingly never-ending series of
intellectual collisions. The recent pertinent Title VII and first
amendment decisions of the United States Supreme Court can
be briefly surveyed, and then we can perhaps begin to search
for jurisprudential survivors.
The requirement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 that the secular employer reasonably accommodate' the
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
1. Section 701(j) was added to Title VII by amendment in 1972. It
defines "religion" as follows:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he
is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or
prospective employee's religious observance or practice without
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). This Title VII language concerning religion is much
closer to Professor Milner Ball's important and valuable sense of the manifes-
tations of a dynamic biblical faith, as distinguished from institutional reli-
gion's usual subservience to the state. See Ball, ,Mormal Religion in America, 4
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religious practices of the religiously-identified employee has
been minimized by the Court. In 1986, the decision of the
Supreme Court in Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook 2 reaf-
firmed and strengthened TWA v. Hardison,' with a vengeance.4
In both cases, the Court supported collective bargaining agree-
ment constraints on the scope of reasonable accommodation.
The Court has consistently been solicitous of the labor contract
institutional prerogatives of seniority systems in this line of
cases. Hardison, a Sabbatarian, was employed as a union-rep-
resented TWA clerk in a 24 hour, 365 day operation at the
Stores Department of the airline's Kansas City base. While
working on the 11 P.M. - 7 A.M. shift, he had sufficient senior-
ity to avoid working on his Sabbath. When he transferred to
another building and shift, he lacked seniority. When he
refused to work on his Sabbath, he was discharged. Because of
labor contract terms, further alternative reduced work sched-
ules or substitutions were not feasible and would have been
unreasonable accommodations, not required by law.
Philbrook, a teacher, had three paid days annually for reli-
gious observance, pursuant to the terms of the labor contract.
He wanted to use additional contractual personal leave time for
additional religious observance, or for his employer to allow
him to pay a substitute on these occasions. As in Hardison, the
Court in Philbrook found that these alternative proposals of the
employee would constitute unreasonable accommodations of
the employee's religious practices and observances by the
employer, not required by law. After these cases, the relig-
iously observant employee in the secular corporation is left
with very little (Title VII) protection for religious practices and
observances. Concomitantly, in Presiding Bishop v. Amos,' non-
profit institutional religious employers were granted wide dis-
cretion,6  and may require secular employee formal
membership in, and compliance with the tenets of, the institu-
2. 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
3. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
4. For recent comprehensive assessment of these two salient Title VII
cases, see generally, Brierton, Religious Discrimination In The Workplace: Who's
Accommodating Who, 39 LAB. L.J. 299 (1988); and Tushnet, The Emerging
Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691 (1988).
5. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
6. Section 702 of Title VII provides some exemptions.
This subchapter shall not apply ... to a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association,
educational institution, or society of its activities.
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tional religion. In Amos, the Court upheld the discharge from
employment of a building engineer for a nonprofit health and
fitness facility operated by the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints because he failed to qualify for a temple recom-
mend-a certificate indicating that he was a member of the
Church in good standing and able to attend its temple services.
Thus, the pertinent Title VII provisions have been ren-
dered largely meaningless as protection for the religiously
observant employee of the secular employer, and have remark-
ably strengthened the discretion granted the institutional non-
profit religious employer to require employee membership in
the religion. Amos, a private sector case brought on Title VII
grounds rather than on first amendment bases, sent a markedly
different signal than did Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor7 in
the 1984 Term.
In Alamo, the Court unanimously affirmed the application
of the federal minimum wage law to protect persons employed
in the commercial enterprises of a religious foundation.8 This
did not interfere with the free exercise rights of the employees,
nor did it excessively entangle the federal government in the
affairs of the religious foundation. Unlike Title VII, the free
exercise clause recently has been strengthened as a protection
for the Sabbatarian unable to work on his Sabbath. Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida,9 in 1987, reaffirmed
and strengthened the line of Supreme Court decisions from
Sherbert v. Verner ° in 1963 through Thomas v. Review Board" in
1981. Now, most recently with Frazee v. Illinois Department of
Employment Security 2 in 1989 extending unemployment com-
pensation eligibility to even a generic Christian who refuses to
work on Sunday, this peculiar line of the "free exercise to
unemployment compensation" cases seems firmly established.
One surely senses that the unsuccessful employees in the
Amos and Ansonia cases, standing on the rapidly eroding
grounds of Title VII, look enviously and quizzically at their suc-
cessful free exercise plaintiff counterparts in Frazee and Hobbie,
and perhaps at the even more unconventional situation of
Native American peyote users now seeking to retain their
7. 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
8. For comprehensive discussion of Alamo and related cases, see
Gregory, The First Amendment Religion Clauses And Labor and Employment Law in
The Supreme Court, 1984 Term, 31 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 1 (1986).
9. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
10. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
11. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
12. 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989).
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employment as drug counselors or to qualify for unemploy-
ment compensation in the alternative.'
3
How can these anomalies between Title VII and the first
amendment religion clauses jurisprudence be explained and
reconciled? They cannot. At best, free exercise champions
may endeavor to throw a lifeline from constitutional shores to
Title VII individual plaintiffs before the latter go over the falls.
But this would require an extension of the Constitution into
the private sphere. Despite elegant scholarship," the chasm
between the public and private spheres is unlikely to be
bridged by the Constitution in the foreseeable future. Mean-
while, if employees have an option, it is clear that the free exer-
cise clause offers far more protection for their religious
practices in the workplace than does the severely debilitated
Title VII.1
5
With this case law overview of recent pertinent Supreme
Court opinions, I now want to shift the focus of my remarks.
Let us consider the legal aspects of attempting to live the inte-
grated life of prayer and work in contemporary secular employ-
ment settings.
Work, or at least the aspiration to work, is pervasive.
Prayer, the attempt to acquire and appreciate a sense of the
presence of God, one would like to think, is likewise pervasive.
This tradition with which I personally identify has common
roots in characters as diverse as Socrates, Jesus, St. Augustine,
St. Benedict, St. Francis, Natty Bumpo, Tecumseh, Wokova,
Black Elk, Peter Maurin, Dorothy Day, Teilhard de Chardin,
Thomas Merton, Oscar Romero, Daniel Berrigan, Helder
Camara, John XXIII and John Paul I 1 i6
13. Employment Div. v. Smith, 108 S. Ct. 1444 (1988); Smith v.
Employment Div. II, 763 P.2d 146 (Or. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1526
(1989). See generally Collins, Oregon Decision In Peyote Case Grants First Amendment
Relief. 11 NAT'L L.J., Feb. 6, 1989, at 22.
14. See, e.g., The Public/Private Distinction (Symposium), 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1289 (1982).
15. See generally Developments-Religion and The State, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1606, 1703-1781 (1987).
16. This is an eclectic, ecumenical, and fully catholic group of religious
"heros." Most are familiarly within the Christian and Catholic traditions. In
this sort of article, some personal background is appropriate. I am a
practicing Roman Catholic. Throughout college, I was a seminarian. My wife
and son are Jews. My father was part Cherokee, and was very comfortable
with his immanent, relatively pantheistic Native American beliefs. Tecumseh,
Wokova, and Black Elk are among the important mystics of the native peoples
of North America. See generally BLACK ELK, BLACK ELK SPEAKS (1932); DEE
BROWN, BURY My HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (1971).
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Lawyers are privileged to work for justice. Indeed, law
professors enjoy the ultimate luxury-the joy of a life engaged
in the affirming work of teaching and writing that we all pre-
sumably love. By dealing in the rarefied realm of high concept,
academics can aspire to the work and prayer mode of classic
contemplation: at least in part, professors are the contempla-
tive Trappists of the academy. Although no lawyer would ever
take a vow of silence, many professors may initially be very
comfortable with this cloistered notion. It is elegant, serene,
platonic, idyllic and ideal. But Trappists also make cheese.
Likewise, law professors presumably prepare students for the
professional career of the active practicing lawyer, necessarily
grounded in the realm of praxis. How does the law professor
harmonize the integrated life of work and prayer, of theory and
praxis? This is done through the integrated life of teaching
and scholarship. They are both very hard work. They both
require thought and action. They both combine aspects of the
monastic and of the communal. One need only consider the
profound scholarship of Milner Ball, Robert Rodes, Thomas
Shaffer, Kent Greenawalt and Michael Perry as prominent aca-
demic lawyers offering examples of integrated lives of work and
prayer. A Simone Weil or Dorothy Day may partially disagree,
but manual labor is not the exclusive means for the integrated
life of prayer and work.
Pray and work. Ora et labora. For more than a millennium,
this has been the motto of the Benedictine monastic order.
One need not be a Benedictine monk to appreciate that the
synergy of prayer and work is very important to the integrated
secular and spiritual life, but consider the beautifully inspira-
tional tradition of Jesus and His followers, such as the Papal
encyclicals and Bishops' letters on the fundamental importance
of the integrated life of prayer and work. 7
The United States has always been deeply and positively
influenced by religious values. Theologians from St. Augustine
to Harvey Cox have long puzzled over how to live a holy life in
the secular city. 8 The Constitution expressly protects the free
exercise of religion as one of our most important rights.' 9
17. I have extensively explored Catholic social teaching on labor in my
recent article, Gregory, Catholic Labor Theory and The Transformation of Work, 45
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 119 (1988); See also Gregory, Overcoming NLRB v.
Yeshiva University by the Implementation of Catholic Labor Theory, 41 LABOR L.J.
55 (1990).
18. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD (1950); H. Cox, THE SECULAR CITY
(1965).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimina-
tion in employment on the basis of religion.2" Title VII
requires employers to provide reasonable accommodation of
employees' religious practices. The statute also grants the reli-
gious employer great discretion in mandating that its employ-
ees adhere to the tenets of the religion. The Supreme Court
has held that these Title VII provisions do not violate the
establishment clause of the first amendment, despite the obvi-
ous potential tensions between the statute and the Constitu-
tion.2 There have been a plethora of important court
decisions that have upheld the right to pray in a variety of set-
tings. Perhaps most prominently in Marsh v. Chambers," the
Supreme Court upheld the right of the Nebraska state legisla-
ture to open its public sessions with a prayer by the legisla-
ture's chaplain, without a violation of the establishment clause.
To be sure, religion clauses jurisprudence often teeters on
the edge of doctrinal incoherence. Despite the Supreme
Court's trend in the mid-1980s toward accommodation,2" not
all religious practices of employees have been protected by the
courts. The late 1980s have witnessed yet another pendulum
swing from accommodationism to separationism. For example,
in Goldman v. Weinberger, 4 the Court ruled that uniform military
dress regulations could prohibit an Orthodox Jewish officer
working as a clinical psychologist in the Air Force from wearing
20. Section 703 of Title VII states in pertinent part:
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms conditions, or privileges of employment because of such
individual's ... religion.
42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(a).
21. See TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v.
Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1987); Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327
(1987).
22. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
23. See Allegheny County v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989) (Menorah
on public property did not violate establishment clause); Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668 (1984) (city funded nativity creche on private property near city
hall did not violate establishment clause); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 782
(1983) (chaplain opening sessions of state legislature with prayer did not
violate establishment clause); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (state law
allowing tax deductions for tuition, textbooks, and transportation costs for
children attending public and private schools did not violate establishment
clause, even though the tax deduction primarily benefited parents of children
attending private parochial schools). For a powerful critique of the Burger
Court's increasing trend toward accommodationism in the early 1980s, see L.
PFEFFER, RELIGION, STATE, AND THE BURGER COURT (1984). For an important
recent discussion, see Tushnet, supra note 4.
24. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
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his yarmulke in accord with his religious beliefs. The courts
have also been quite solicitous of the rights of religious institu-
tions to dictate terms of doctrinal compliance to their employ-
ees in nonprofit religious, as opposed to purely secular,
environments.25 I will not exhaustively recross this already
familiar ground.26
Rather, I want to explore the constitutional and Title VII
dimensions of the role of prayer and related religious practices
in the secular workplace. Obviously, public-sector employers
are governed by both the first amendment clauses and by Title
VII. Private sector employers are bound by Title VII, but not
directly by the first amendment religion clauses. The American
Bar Association advertises a members' prayer group session at
its annual meeting. Members of the United States Congress
hold prayer meetings. Can private employers do the same?
More specifically, can executives and managers within private
secular corporations condition employment opportunities on
subordinates' attendance at religiously affiliated meetings, or
upon subordinates' compliance with, or acquiescence to, reli-
gious practices of senior managers and supervisors within the
otherwise secular business organization?
While the negative answer seems obvious, it may not inva-
riably be so simple. Assuming arguendo that this question can
be resolved, what then of the free exercise rights of the relig-
iously observant individual senior executives of the private sec-
ular corporation? Have their religious rights not been
reasonably accommodated, in violation of Title VII? By the
terms of their religion, they may be commanded by scriptures
to preach, teach, baptize and convert universally, as "fishers of
men." If they must preach from the rooftops, is the secular
employment setting exempted? The Hegelian sense of tragedy
is exquisitely posed here as the tension between two rights,
rather than the easy choice between an obvious right and a
clear wrong.
Notice that the first amendment religion clauses are not
directly at issue in these private sector employment settings.
Prayer and related religious practices in the secular workplace
present situations that test the farthest bounds of civil rights
employment discrimination law, transcending the classic public
sector setting of the Constitution.
25. Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
26. I have extensively discussed many of these themes in Gregory, supra
note 8.
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When Title VII was enacted, the emphasis of the statute
was on protecting the religious practices of those discrete and
insular minorities not fully able to otherwise assert their reli-
gious rights in majoritarian environments.2 7 The current situa-
tion in employment contexts is often markedly different. It
may not always be the subordinate religious practitioner who
must be protected from antireligious secular employers.
28
Rather, in a fashion that the drafters of Title VII never antici-
pated, the atheist, agnostic, nonaligned, or otherwise aligned
subordinate employee may assert the protections of the statute,
and, additionally, in public sector employment, of the Constitu-
tion, from the religious practices of senior management in
otherwise primarily secular employment.
There may be some loose analogies from other areas of
civil rights law. The initial request or suggestion or invitation
extended by senior management to subordinate employees to
attend, for example, a prayer meeting or a prayer breakfast, or
the opening of a business meeting with a prayer, will more
likely be unexpected or surprising rather than inherently
unwelcome or repugnant. Employees may feel nonplussed,
embarrassed, curious, or uncomfortable, but it is not likely that
most employees would find the first overture to pray inherently
reprehensible. This is not to say that, as in tort law, the first
bite is free and that there can never be any harm caused by
asking.29 Religion rarely leaves one completely unaffected.
While adult employees are not as susceptible to institutional
prayer as the public school children in Engle v. Vitale,3 ° the ini-
tial exposure to prayer may quickly transmogrify into an unwel-
come, unpleasant experience for the subordinate employee.
But neither is this to equate prayer with, for example, sex-
ual harassment. Prayer is inherently affirming. Sexual harass-
ment has nothing whatever affirming about it, and is inherently
27. U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938).
28. The Supreme Court usually has been very solicitous of protecting
the free exercise right of the religious minority practitioner in secular
employment. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136
(1987) (Florida's denial of unemployment compensation to Sabbatarian who
refused to work on her sabbath violated her free exercise right). But see TWA
v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S.
60 (1987) (Title VII reasonable accommodation duty of employer towards
religious employee's practices is no more than de minimis).
29. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1055 (1936).
30. 370 U.S. 421 (1962); See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)
(Alabama moment of silence statute, which expressly encouraged silent
prayer, violated establishment clause).
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repulsive. For committed atheists, prayer is a silly waste of
time. Of course, for the atheist or for the employee identified
with another religion, coerced, involuntary submission to
prayer certainly could quickly become fully as unwelcome as
sexual harassment. Coerced prayer potentially can be religious
harassment (to say nothing of how the prayer itself is also
thereby debased). The core test to determine whether unlaw-
ful employee sexual harassment has occurred is whether the
overture is unwelcome.3' Objectively, sexual harassment is
egregiously, tortiously offensive by its very essence; prayer is
not. But if the prayer environment becomes coerced and invol-
untary, it potentially can become as offensive and as repugnant
as unlawful sexual harassment.
In the secular workplace, can the law simultaneously pro-
tect the rights of religiously identified persons and of those
who wish to be free from such practices, without the inevitable
tensions that otherwise occur between the free exercise and
establishment clauses? Can the Hegelian tragedy of two com-
peting rights be resolved? Thus far, the few cases on point sug-
gest that an adequate but imperfect balance can be achieved.
Young v. Southwestern Savings and Loan Association 32 perfectly
illustrates the tensions that occur when a secular private sector
employer has managerial agents imposing unwelcome religious
practices on subordinate employees as a condition of
employment.
Mrs. Young began employment as a teller for the bank in
February, 1971. She knew that all employees were required to
attend a monthly staff meeting at the downtown office of the
bank. Employees were paid for these 45 minute meetings,
which reviewed bank business, ranging from organization pol-
icy to future planning. The problem for Mrs. Young, a former
Unitarian and now an atheist, was that the monthly meeting
began with "a short religious talk and a prayer, both delivered
by a local Baptist minister.
' '3 1
Mrs. Young attended the first two monthly meetings, but
thereafter resolved no longer to attend because she felt that
her freedom of conscience was being violated by the convoca-
tion prayers. She did not mention this to anyone. She simply
ceased her attendance. Her absence was finally noted at the
31. Meritor v. Savings Bank, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) ("The correct
inquiry is whether [the victim] by her conduct indicated that the sexual
advances were unwelcome"). See also Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, 29 C.F.R. § 1504.11 (1986).
32. 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975).
33. Id. at 142.
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September, 1971 monthly meeting. Management informed her
that her attendance was mandatory and that the primary pur-
pose of the monthly meeting was discussion of bank business.
She was told that she "had an obligation to attend the entire
meeting, and advised her that if she objected to the devotion-
als, she could simply 'close her ears' during that time."13 4 She
disclosed her reason for not attending the. meetings, and
because she would not compromise her beliefs, she involunta-
rily resigned "in order to escape intolerable and illegal employ-
ment requirements." 35 She was constructively discharged.
The Fifth Circuit found in her favor and reversed the dis-
charge. The court found "that Mrs. Young was constructively
discharged in circumstances which amounted to religious dis-
crimination against her by Southwestern."
3 6
The court immediately focused on the opening prayer at
the mandatory monthly bank business meeting as unlawful
employment discrimination on the basis of religion, in violation
of Title VII. "This theological appetizer, nondenominational
though it might be, was somewhat uncongenial to plaintiff, who
is an atheist," 3 7 they wrote.
Most recently, in September of 1988, the Ninth Circuit fur-
ther incisively elucidated the spectrum of complex issues in
E.E.O.C. v. Townley Engineering and Manufacturing Company.38
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari 9 in March,
1989, the issue is certain to again come before the Court.
Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit's opinion and the formidable dis-
sent of Judge John Noonan4" crystalize these novel problems.
The court of appeals held that an atheist employee who affirm-
atively objected could not be compelled to attend the religious
services sponsored upon the premises of the employer, a min-
ing equipment manufacturer. The court found that the free
exercise rights of the religiously identified owners of secular
corporations must, on balance, yield to the Title VII protection
afforded objecting employees.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 144.
36. Id. at 143.
37. Id. at 142.
38. 859 F.2d 610,47 Fair Empl. Proc. Cas. (BNA) 1601 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1527 (1989).
39. Id.
40. Prior to his appointment to the Ninth Circuit by President Reagan,
Judge Noonan was a professor of law at Notre Dame and at the University of
California at Berkeley Boalt Hall School of Law. He has a Ph.D. in
philosophy from the Catholic University of America and law degree from
Harvard, and he has written extensively about legal ethics.
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"Where the practices of employer and employee conflict,
as in this case, it is not inappropriate to require the
employer, who structures the workplace to a substantial
degree, to travel the extra mile in adjusting its free exer-
cise rights, if any, to accommodate the employee's Title
VII rights."'"
The closely held corporation at issue was founded in 1964
by Jake and Helen Townley, who own 94% of the stock. It
manufactures mining equipment for commercial profit at sev-
eral different facilities. When the Townleys, who are born
again Christians, founded the business, they "made a covenant
with God that their business 'would be a Christian, faith oper-
ated business.'"42 The company prints and encloses Gospel
quotes on all of its documents and all of its mail, and financially
supports missionaries.
It held weekly religious devotional services in the work-
place. "They typically last from thirty to forty-five minutes, and
may include prayer, thanksgiving to God, singing, testimony,
and scripture reading, as well as discussion of business-related
matters. Townley required all employees to attend the weekly
services; failure to attend was regarded as equivalent to not
attending work."' 43 These services were conducted at the cor-
poration's Florida facility since it commenced operations in
1963. It opened an Arizona facility in 1973, but did not insti-
tute the weekly religious devotional services there until 1984.
An atheist employee, hired at the Arizona facility in 1979,
objected to the services shortly after they were instituted in
1984.44 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiff, ruling that requiring employees to attend its reli-
gious services and failing to accommodate the requests of the
atheist employee to be excused violated Title VII.
Upon review, the Ninth Circuit held that
Congress did clearly intend for Title VII to cover Town-
ley's mandatory devotional services. Sections 701(j) and
703(a) of Title VII make clear that requiring employees
over their objections to attend devotional services cannot
be reconciled with Title VII's prohibition against reli-
gious discrimination. Furthermore, we hold that Con-
41. 859 F.2d at 621.
42. Id. at 612.
43. Id.
44. The atheist employee shortly thereafter left the company, claiming
constructive discharge. In April, 1988, the district court ruled in favor of the
employee; that issue, however, was not before the Ninth Circuit.
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gress did not intend section 702's exemption for
religious corporations to shield corporations such as
Townley. We do hold, however, that Jake and Helen
Townley have certain rights under the Free Exercise
Clause that Title VII cannot infringe.45
Although the owners were devoutly religious, their corpo-
ration was secular in its purpose and operation; it manufac-
tured mining equipment. Therefore, it could not claim the
status of a religious corporation within the meaning of § 702 of
Title VII. The religious affiliations and practices of the individ-
ual owners did not transform the secular corporation into a
religious organization. "We merely hold that the beliefs of the
owners and operators of a corporation are simply not enough
in themselves to make the corporation 'religious' within the
meaning of section 702,"46 the court wrote.
The employer admitted that it never attempted to accom-
modate the atheist employee's objections to the religious serv-
ices. The employee was told he could wear earplugs and/or
read a newspaper, but that otherwise he had to be physically
present. Despite the dissent's view that these conditions were a
sufficient accommodation, the majority of the court agreed with
the employee's proposal that the employer reasonably accom-
modate his request to be excused from attendance, ruling that
"the burden of attempting an accommodation rests with the
employer rather than the employee." 4 7 The spiritual cost to
the owners' free exercise rights would have to be borne, and
thus yield to the Title VII right of the objecting employee to be
excused from attending the employer's religious services. The
court emphasized that the employer's Arizona facility operated
for its first eleven years, from its opening in 1973 to 1984, with-
out the weekly religious services. The inclusion of some busi-
ness discussions in the weekly meeting was not sufficient to free
the weekly meeting of its inherently religious nature.
In summing up, the Ninth Circuit defined the heart of the
employee's Title VII protections. "Protecting an employee's
right to be free from forced observance of the religion of his
employer is at the heart of Title VII's prohibition against reli-
gious discrimination."48
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit concomitantly recognized
the owners' admittedly subordinated free exercise rights, and
45. 859 F.2d at 613.
46. Id. at 619.
47. Id. at 615.
48. Id. at 620-2 1.
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narrowed the scope of the lower court's injunction. Title VII
does not require employers to abandon religion, but rather
attempts to achieve an accommodation of conflicting employer
and employee practices in our pluralistic society. The district
court improperly enjoined all mandatory religious services at
the employer's Arizona facility. This was unduly broad, and
unnecessarily trammelled the owners' free exercise rights.
Rather, only those employees who objected to attending the
religious services and asked to be excused from physically
attending would be protected. Otherwise, the mandatory
nature of the services alone was not a sufficient basis upon
which to support the original injunction.
Even if they wear earplugs and read a newspaper, adults
can no more "close their ears" to the spiritual ambience cre-
ated by vocalized prayer in the private-sector work environ-
ment than can children in the public schools. The former
clearly violates Title VII, the latter, the first amendment reli-
gion clauses.
The pivotal factor is not the employer's endorsement and
sponsorship of prayer per se. In an adult employment environ-
ment, there ought not be any harm in the initial invitation to
join in prayer. But it is essential that the religious activity be
optional, and that no adverse employment consequences occur
because one chooses not to participate.
While the initial offer can be unexpected, it must not be
pursued so as to transform an informal invitation into a
coerced, unwelcome condition of employment. At that point,
unlawful religious harassment and sexual harassment become
virtually indistinguishable.
Private-sector secular employers need not abolish all reli-
gious activities that they had previously permitted, sponsored,
or endorsed. Similarly, the meticulous employer who wishes to
prevent sexual harassment need not abolish all business
lunches or office parties simply because these are opportunities
where unlawful overtures may occur. Rather, the more pru-
dent and realistic alternative is to scrutinize and prohibit any
unlawful conduct that might occur in these otherwise lawful
and appropriate settings. This can be difficult, but certainly
not impossible, for a conscientious employer to do. Employers
must carefully ensure that employees who choose not to attend
employer sponsored prayer meetings do not unlawfully suffer
any deprivation of employment opportunities by their nonpar-
ticipation-admittedly a task that will require careful personnel
administration, and a task that must be accomplished without
separating non-participants as any isolated control group.
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The Ninth Circuit decision provides a potentially workable
and pragmatic schematic to safeguard the rights of all parties.
But the-majority opinion did not fully address the perhaps ulti-
mately more important, nonnegotiable rights highlighted by
Judge Noonan in his formidable dissent,4 9 namely, the rights of
those who wish to pray in the secular workplace. Because so
much of modem life is bound up with work, the workplace is a
fully appropriate setting to integrate the life of prayer and
work. According to the dissent, the owners who wished to pray
with their employees should not be forced to bifurcate the inte-
grated dimensions of prayer and work.5" It is a critically impor-
tant theme that, despite the Supreme Court's recent denial of
certiorari, seems certain to appear again before the Court and
demand a resolution. Forms of mandated practice may be
quite different from Christian evangelism. If the integrated life
of prayer and work prevails over pragmatic separation of vari-
ous employees' interests to respect everyone's rights, the dis-
sent in Townley may eventually prevail.
Essentially, I am a separationist and I am troubled and sad-
dened by the potential bastardization of publicized prayer,
whether in schools, in factories, or in offices. Yet, I am also a
practicing Roman Catholic and therefore necessarily I am also
one who strives to live an integrated life of prayer and work.
49. Townley, 859 F.2d at 622.
50. Judge Noonan's sharp critique of the bifurcated life merits
quotation at length.
The agency and the court appear to assume that there must be a
sharp division between secular activity and religious activity .... But
of course such a dichotomy is a species of theology. The theological
position is that human beings should worship God on Sundays or
some other chosen day and go about their business without
reference to God the rest of the time. Such a split is attractive to
some religious persons. It is repudiated by many, especially those
who seek to integrate their lives and to integrate their activities.
Among those who repudiate this theology is the Townley
Manufacturing Company.
.... For an agency of the government, or Congress, or a court
to say that the Townleys are mistaken in their beliefs or that the
Townley Manufacturing Company cannot have the purpose ascribed
to it and shall not carry out the program of devotion it has set up is
to make a theological judgment-a theological judgment fairly
characterized as reflecting either a secularism skeptical of God's
existence and power or a species of deism that radically isolates God
from the world that believers believe God created and animates and
directs. The First Amendment prohibits an agency of government,
or Congress, or even a court, from imposing such a theological
judgment to curb the free exercise of religion.
859 F.2d at 624-25.
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The free exercise clause, has as much vitality for me on the
microcosmic, individual level as the separationist foundation of
the establishment clause has appeal on the conceptual, struc-
tural, macrocosmic level. The establishment clause can per-
haps yield justice, or at least keep us from killing one another
in the name of religion. The free exercise clause is much risk-
ier, but in that risk perhaps exists the potential for the full
flowering of justice into the love of one another.
The tensions in our religion clauses and Title VII jurispru-
dence can never be fully harmonized. However, with sensitivity
and concern for everyone's rights, delicate balances can be
achieved, if carefully and constantly recalibrated. But maybe to
choose the lawyer's safe balance is dry and arid. Maybe we
should take some risks, even in law. I shall end on an affirming,
risky note. Oremus. Let us pray.

